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The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the largest land retirement  program ever 
operated  in  the  US.  Since  its  inception  in  1985,  many  researchers  have  studied  the 
impacts  of  this  program;  however,  only  a  few  have  analyzed  how  the  CRP  affects 
surrounding non–enrolled parcels. In this research I examine how the CRP may affect the 
conversion of  non–cropped land to agriculture, a phenomenon referred to as “slippage” 
in  the  literature,  and  specifically  addressed  by  Wu  (2000)  and  Roberts  and  Bucholtz 
(2005). Building on these earlier studies, I empirically model slippage using data derived 
from satellite imagery that provides information on land cover changes between 1992 and 
2001. The study area consists of 1,053 counties located in the Northern Plains, Corn Belt 
and Lake States regions. Results support the existence of slippage effects from the CRP, 
but  they  are  more  conservative  than  the  ones  found  by  Wu  (2000).  The  evidence  of 
slippage  provided  here  is  important  information  for  planners,  given  that  whether  and  
how  the  CRP  affects  land  use  decisions  in  surrounding  areas  is  key  information  for 
implementing conservation efforts more efficiently.  
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 The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the largest agricultural land retirement 
effort ever operated in the US. Since its inception in 1985, the CRP has retired over 30 
million  acres  of  cropland  with  an  annual  rental  payment  of  approximately  $2  billion 
(Sullivan  et  al.  2004).  Several  evaluations  have  been  made  of  the  environmental  and 
economic  benefits  of  this  program,  and  most  researchers  have  agreed  on  overall 
contributions and benefits (Young and Osborn 1990; Sullivan et al. 2004). However, the 
spatial  effects of the CRP  on  surrounding  non–enrolled land have received  much less 
attention in the literature. In this research I focus on the indirect effects that, within a 
region, the presence of the CRP may have on the conversion of forest, grass and wet 
lands  to  agriculture,  a  phenomenon  denoted  as  “slippage  effect”  in  the  agricultural 
economics literature.  
Only two previous studies have investigated (and debated) the slippage effect of the 
CRP  in  depth: Wu (2000), and Roberts and Bucholtz (RB) (2005). While  the  former 
claims that the CRP produces a 20% rate of slippage, the latter states that there is no 
evidence  of  real  slippage  coming  from  the  CRP.
1  Both studies, however, leave more 
questions than clarifications about the slippage issue.  Given these inconsistent findings 
and the importance of the topic for agricultural policy and environmental issues, my 
research questions can be summarized in two main points: 
 
1)  Does satellite imagery provide evidence of slippage effects from the CRP?  
                                                   
1 This debate has taken place in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. In a comment to Wu 
(2000), Roberts and Bucholtz presented evidence refuting the findings of slippage. Addressing the disputed 
issues of Roberts and Bucholtz’s comment, Wu presented a reply (Wu 2005) that was later questioned by a 
rejoinder of Roberts and Bucholtz (2006).   2)  If slippage from the CRP is occurring, why and how is this affecting different 
land covers?   
 
In order to address these questions, using spatial cross–sectional models for a 
sample of 1,053 American counties, this article analyzes the potential slippage produced 
by the CRP looking at data obtained from satellite imagery provided by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS). In 2008 the USGS released a “National Land Cover Data 
(NLCD) Retrofit Change Product”
 that provides information on land cover changes 
across the U.S. between two periods (Fry et al. 2009). This product allows researchers to 
observe changes in land covers from, for instance, forest land to agriculture and vice 
versa. With this information, new evaluations and assessments can be done for policies 
that affect land use decisions such as the CRP. 
Other studies have modeled the sources of slippage theoretically (Rygnestad and 
Fraser 1996; Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock 2001) and empirically quantified this problem 
for conservation programs ( Fraser and Waschik 2005). However, to my knowledge, no 
one has addressed either theoretically or empirically the open questions left by the studies 
of Wu (2000, 2005) and RB (2005, 2006). 
 
 
Slippage Sources and Land Use Theory  
Among the theoretical explanations for the sources of slippage, Wu (2000) postulates two 
alternatives: an output price feedback effect, and land substitution effects. The former effect refers to slippage coming from the reduction in output from the retired land that 
causes a supply shortage, leading to an increase in the output price. The increase in 
commodity prices provides an incentive to farmers to convert non–cropped land into 
production (Wu 2000; Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock 2001). However, as Wu states, it is 
not possible to examine how the CRP affects output prices, while at the same time 
examining how these changes in output prices affect land conversion, using cross–
sectional data (Wu 2000). Therefore, given that my analysis of slippage considers a one 
period cross–sectional model, I focus this section on expanding the land substitution 
effects and other theoretical sources of slippage.  
Other potential sources of slippage related to programs paying for working land 
retirement are related to (i) land substitution effects, (ii) the re–allocation of fixed inputs 
used in agriculture, and (iii) and changes in land option value. These are important issues 
related to CRP enrollment that could affect farmers’ decisions about converting non–
cropped land into production.  Final decisions will be explained by land use theory. 
 
Land Substitution Effects 
Wu (2000) describes these effects as a farmer’s land use decision based on the marginal 
productivity of land. Figure 1 describes the logic of this source, where AH, AMC, AMN, AL, 
and ACRP denote acres of high land quality cropped, medium land quality cropped, 
medium land quality non–cropped, low non–cropped land quality and land under the 
CRP, respectively.  
 In figure 1 the distance between the vertical lines is the total amount of medium 
quality land (          . Thus, when the CRP reduces the amount of    , the 
marginal profitability of cropping increases with respect to non–cropped land, producing 
slippage (  ). If not regulated, a farmer would engage in slippage (within her farm) up to 
the point of equalizing the marginal profitability of cropping to the marginal profitability 
of non–cropping (Wu 2000); 
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where    and    denote the profitability of cropping and non–cropping, respectively. 
       
Reallocation of Fixed Inputs 
Given that a land retirement program reduces land under actual production, it can be 
expected to produce an oversupply of resources considered fixed in agriculture such as 
machinery, buildings or even household labor (Hoag, Babcock, and Foster 1993). In this 
context fixed resources would be underutilized in scenarios where agricultural land is 
reduced due to CRP enrollment. Given this oversupply, there is an incentive to bring land 
into agriculture in order to use the available resources and thus take advantage of sunk 
costs. 
Although this point can be interpreted as an increase in the marginal profitability of 
cropping as described before, the concept is slightly different because it is a source of 
slippage at the farm or community levels. Fixed inputs can be allocated within the same farm or somewhere else (with no market constraints). For example, if a particular farm 
has all land in agriculture and the CRP is implemented there, the available fixed 
resources no longer fully used (like tractor hours) can be sublet to neighboring farms (that 
can expand agriculture now that more inputs are available).  
Even if in the long term oversupplied inputs can be liquidated, there would be a 
kind of input price effect similar to the output price effect: an increase in the availability 
of agricultural inputs (not used because of CRP land) would reduce the price of these and 
consequently increase demand that could facilitate conversion of non–cropped land to 
agriculture. Observing a farm’s profit function,  
 
(2)        = p(q) x q - C(q) - F                               
 
where p is output price, q is total output, C is variable cost, and F denotes fixed costs), as 
F decreases, agriculture becomes more profitable and therefore more land is demanded 
for it. This phenomenon would have limitations similar to the output–price effect when 
measuring it with cross–sectional data, but to a lesser extent given that the input price 
effect would be more local: a fixed input, like a tractor, is difficult to transport so prices 
would vary more across counties or regions.
2 The liquidation of fixed inputs by a local 
farmer would be more available only in that certain location and under transport/distance 
limitations.  
 
                                                   
2 Differently from output prices that have little (or no) variation across counties.  Changes in Land Option Value 
As Wu mentions in his reply to RB comment (Wu 2005), and as more fully described by 
Lin and Wu (2005), the land value of a particular farm can be increased due to the 
presence of CRP. The CRP provides a new option value to farmers by the potential 
enrollment to CRP and the revenues that this non–uncertain federal payment can generate 
to farm households. Thus, for instance, land that in the past was not cultivated because 
generated not marginally gains to the farm can now be brought into production triggered 
by an expected CRP enrollment that would generate income to the farm household.  The 
expected net return to cropland increases as CRP becomes an institution in a county, 
which in consequence may foment the incorporation of non–cropped land to agriculture. 
The expected returns from parcel j once converted to agriculture (R
a), can be 
described by (Lin and Wu 2005):  
 
(3)     R
a =     (1–m)  +  m Max(  , Pb* + (1–P)   )   
 =  Max(  ,    (1–m) + m(Pb* + (1–P)   )                 
 
where P is the probability of a bid being accepted into CRP and b* is the optimal bid that 
a farmer will submit m equals 1 if the land is eligible to enroll into the CRP, 0 otherwise 
(Lin and Wu 2005). Thus, if a farmer considers that P increases because the CRP is a 
common practice in her region, there would be an increase in the expected returns to obtain from a parcel converted to agriculture. There would be option values of obtaining 
not only agricultural profits, but the certainty of the CRP payments.
3  
 
Land Use Change Decisions 
While Wu’s substitution effect is based on decisions made within farms, I argue that 
slippage effect could be a community phenomenon given that slippage sources coming 
from land option values and the reallocation of fixed inputs are clearly affecting land 
beyond the limit of farms enrolling in the CRP. This would support why the slippage 
effect can be explained by cross–sectional aggregated–(county)–level evaluations. 
However, these points must be considered as only potential sources to slippage. In real 
life probably none, one or many of these sources will affect the final land use decisions 
made by a particular farmer or group of farmers. The final slippage decision would be 
considered by a farmer given her present value (PV) of land that currently is out of 
production: 
                                                   
3 Criticizing this slippage source, RB rejoinder to Wu’s reply (Roberts and Bucholtz 2006) establishes that 
“Slippage stemming from new CRP–induced option values would be similar to that stemming from a CRP–
induced rise in commodity prices.”(Roberts and Bucholtz 2006, p. 513).  However, differently from the 
output price effect, the effects of CRP in option values are likely to be more local than output prices change 
effects. The land price effect of a farm enrolled in the CRP can only be observable by neighbor farmers: a 
farmer (farmer A) can observe how much farmland her neighborhood (farmer B) has under CRP and also 
observe the consequent change in the price of farmers B land. This is not necessarily true when farmers A 
and B are far enough that to obtain information about each other becomes restrictive. This kind of relation 
would allow estimating CRP slippage effects using cross–sectional models.  
Another comment that RB (2006) make about the option value refers to the threshold that the CRP 
program has for every county (25% of a county’s land). The authors state “…one might expect a negative 
relationship between past enrollments and future opportunities, especially for areas near mandated CRP 
enrollment thresholds or having little remaining land that might be made eligible for CRP.”(Roberts and 
Bucholtz 2006, p. 513). I argue that this argument could be valid, but difficult to occur in reality because of 
two points: (a) it is very unlikely that all farmers would have the exact knowledge that their particular 
county is in the edge of the mandated enrollment threshold; and (b) with the implementation of the 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) system, land eligible for CRP is based on a competitive bid system 
that could transform non–eligible land for old CRP sign–ups to land eligible for new CRP enrollment.  
 (4)           {∫        (         ∫       (           
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where E{} is the expectation operator, R
nc is the current rent obtained from the non–
cropped land, Cc is the conversion cost (the cost of transforming non–cropped land to 
agriculture), t is time, t+h is the time when the land is converted to agriculture, and r is 
the discount rate. Equation (4) implies that non–cropped land value equals the present 
value of expected returns of the non–cropped land up to date of conversion plus the 
present value of the expected agricultural returns minus conversion costs.  
As described in equation set (3), R
a is directly affected by the probability of having the 
CRP in a farm. So, the presence of this program induces an increase in R
a. On the other 
hand, R
a would tend to be increased with CRP presence in other parcels given that the 
output price effect increases p and/or slippage sources (i) and (ii) increase    . There is 
an increase in the expected profitability of agriculture.  
Given (4) and following (Capozza and Helsley 1990), the farmer chooses the 
conversion of non–cropped land to agriculture when the agricultural land rent is greater 
than or equal to a reservation rent: R
a ≥ R*,   with R* ≡ R
nc + r Cc . 
The reservation rent is given by the rent that is obtained from the non–cropped use 
of land plus the conversion costs. Given this specification, it is clear that slippage will 
directly depend on the R
a, R
nc and Cc variables. It was already discussed that CRP will 
tend to increase R
a, therefore important is to define how R
nc and Cc weight in the decision 
of slippage. Of these factors it is more straightforward to observe the role of Cc in the 
final decision. Thus, for instance, let say that a farm faces three different conversion costs in three different parcels: Cca > Ccb > Ccc; it would be more expectable to find slippage 
in the parcel with the conversion costs given by Ccc and less in the land with conversion 
costs of Cca. Slippage will present higher rates in parcels with Ccc, given other factors 
constant.  
With respect to R
nc, the values of this variable will depend directly on the market or 
non–market value given to the non–cropped land. For commercial use the price obtained 
for non–agricultural production is important to consider when estimating final decisions 
of slippage. Logically a farmer will not convert if R
nc > R
a, whatever the level of Cc. The 
analysis turns more complex when non–cropped land is not used for commercial ends (at 
least not entirely) and bequest or amenity values are important to the farmer.  
 
 
Methodology of Research  
In order to have a direct comparison, the area under study in this research is chosen to be 
similar to the one used by Wu (2000) and RB (2005), i.e., the Northern Plains, Corn Belt 
and Lake States regions of the U.S. However, one difference of this study is that instead 
of using the regions’ 107 Agricultural Districts as subjects of analysis (as the mentioned 




                                                   
4 Menominee County (WI) is excluded from the analysis because it does not report data on most of the 
sources used.  Following RB (2005) –who follow Wu (2000), I first employ linear regression 
models to predict non–cropped land conversion to agriculture (NewAg) based on four 
main covariates: beginning of the period percentage of acres under the CRP over the total 
non–urbanized acres of the county (variable that is going to show slippage), population 
change (Pop∆), farm size change (FarmSize∆) and total county land area
5 (Land). Thus, 
similarly to the approach of RB, the basic empirical model is denoted by: 
 
(5)     NewAg = 0 + 1 CRP + 2 Pop∆ + 3 FarmSize∆ + 4 Land + e .                       
 
In order to expand RB’s model and include variables that may affect a farmer’s 
final land use decision, I include four covariates to (5): the distance of the country 
centroid to the closest highway (Dist) –to control for county accessibility; the percentage 
of urban growth in surrounding counties (Sprawl) –to control for urban land demand; 
changes in net agricultural rent of counties between 1992 and 2002 (Netcroprent) –to 
control for changes in R
a; and a dummy variable for the nonmetropolitan status of the 
county (Rural dummy) –to control for non–agricultural income sources. Additionally, all 
models include binary variables to control for state fixed effects.  
Equation (4) establishes that land conversion will depend directly on conversion 
costs. Thus, if we consider that different land covers would have different costs of 
conversion, disaggregating the NewAg variable could help to observe whether the CRP 
slippage is affected by conversion costs or not. In this way, I specify a second 
                                                   
5 Total land area excludes urbanized land in this article. All calculations done over total land (like the % of 
CRP land in a county) consider this description –see table 1. econometric approach where the dependent variable of model (5) is transformed to three 
different variables: conversion of forest land to agriculture (For_toAg), of grassland to 
agriculture (Grass_toAg), and of wetland to agriculture (Wet_toAg). 
 
Endogeneity and Contract Expirations  
One important issue brought into discussion by RB (2005) is the endogeneity that the 
CRP variable may have in the model represented by equation (5) and its expansions. 
These authors state that given that enrollments in the CRP is a variable that reflect 
choices made by farmers during the same period they made decisions to convert non–
cropped land to agriculture (our dependent variable(s)), OLS estimations would not be 
valid because of endogeneity between these variables. I approach the endogeneity issue 
using two instruments (in two different models): the % of CRP land lagged by two years 
(from the begging of the period analyzed), and the weighted average of the % of land 
under CRP (also lagged by two years) in the adjacent counties (WCRP).
6 
On the other hand, one important issue to control for when evaluating the slippage 
coming from the CRP, or other land retirement programs, is the expiration of contracts. 
Some studies have analyzed CRP expirations and appraised the consequent likelihood of 
land conversions (Roberts and Lubowski 2007; Sullivan et al. 2004). In particular, 
Roberts and Lubowski (2007) report that only 10.5% of all the CRP land by 1992 exited 
the program between 1992 and 1997,
7 and that from this amount approximately 62% 
                                                   
6 The neighborhoods’ average level (of the potential endogenous variable) has been used as an instrument 
in other economic empirical studies [see for example Benjamin (1992)]. 
7 This period covers the expiration of contracts from the first CRP sign–ups, produced during 1985 to 1987. returned to crop production. From this total land converted to crop after CRP contract 
expirations (in total, 2.2 millions of acres by 1997), 96% came from grasses and/or 
legumes. In relation to this conversion to agriculture, Sullivan et. al. (2004) mentions that 
this is a sort of “reversed slippage” given that CRP land coming into production (after 
contract expirations) in one area may cause non–CRP land to drop out of production in 
other areas.  
In order to control for contract expiration, I include a variable based on difference 
in the levels of CRP (CRPdiff90_00). The endogenenity of this variable is more 
questionable because, differently from the initial CRP levels, many of the CRP land 
exiting the program are not necessarily consequence of decisions made by farmers, but by 
USDA planers.  
 
Spatial Models  
Given that land use change is likely to be a decision triggered by land cover changes in 
neighborhood areas, before doing further econometric analyses I investigate the 
dependent variable for spatial dependency using Moran’s I statistics. These estimations 
indicate that there is less than a 1% likelihood that NewAg is the result of random chance 
without spatial influence.
8 This evidence implies that spatial dependence is a likely 
source of bias if simple linear regressions are used. For this reason, in addition to 
ordinary least squares (OLS), an analysis is carried out to consider the influences that 
                                                   
8 Moran’s I statistics were in the range 0.35–0.60. These values were calculated with ArcGIS 9.3 and 
GeoDa 0.9.5–i software, using different spatial weights matrices (linear and squared distance, and queen 
contiguity weights). spatial dependence may have. I considered three alternative specifications. One 
specification, which works through a spatial lag, is the spatial autoregressive model 
(SAR). This model includes an additional covariate that can be written as Wy , where W  
is a spatial weights matrix and  y  is a vector of values of the dependent variable(s). A 
second specification is the spatial error model (SEM), in which spatial dependence works 
through the model’s error term (Anselin 1988). A third model, known as the general 
spatial model (SAC), incorporates both spatial lag and spatial error terms (Anselin 1988; 
Kelejian and Prucha 1998). Formally, the SAC model, that includes both the SAR and 
SEM specifications, can be interpreted as:  
 
y = X + ρWy + u 
(6)     u = λWu + e 
e  ~  N (0, σ
2 In) ,                          
 
where X represents a matrix containing the right–hand–side variables of the model and e 
is an error term normally distributed. The spatial models use a symmetric row for W –
standardized adjacency matrix (derived from Delaunay triangulation) and are estimated 




 Data  
The data for the dependent variables (and the covariates Sprawl and Land) come from 
satellite imagery data obtained from the “NLCD Retrofit Change Product”
 9 provided by 
the USGS, using ArcGIS version 9.3. The NLCD Retrofit Change Product is a raster GIS 
file provided in grid format, meaning it is divided into uniform–sized grid cells (pixels). 
The size of the grid cells are 30 by 30 meters, with each classified as a single land use or 
land use conversion. The difference of this product from other satellite raster files is that 
it incorporates pixels that have been adjusted to allow the most accurate satellite imagery 
showing land cover changes across the U.S. between two periods, up to date (Fry et al. 
2009).  In particular, the land cover change information is given for the period 1992–
2001. 
One advantage of using the NLCD Retrofit Change Product is that it is possible to 
observe in what direction the land cover change has occurred. Thus, we can observe how 
much forest, grass and wet lands have been converted to agriculture within the period 
1992–2001 across the region. Thus, as mentioned previously, this feature provides data 
that allow constructing the dependent variables based on different initial land covers.  
Additional sources used for gathering explanatory variables include the Population 
and Agricultural Census (provided by USA counties
10) and the USDA CRP data. Table 1 
shows the main statistics, definitions and sources of data for the variables to consider in 
the above described models. Figure 2 shows the enrollment levels of the CRP in the 
counties of the area under study to 1990.  
                                                   
9 Further information about this product is available here: http://www.mrlc.gov/multizone.php  
10 http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml Results 
All Models were estimated using state fixed effects, but these coefficients are not 
reported. Table 2 shows the estimation results obtained from OLS with the CRP lagged 
by two years (CRP90). Table 3 reports results from OLS for the models using the 
alternative instrument for the CRP variable as described before (WCRP90), and table 4 
reports SAC estimates given that both spatial lag (rho) and spatial error (lambda) terms 
are statistically significant.
11 The OLS and the SAC models used in this article give (in 
general) similar results, so in order to expand discussion I do not discriminate one model 
over the other. The first column of results of tables 2 and 3 states that the CRP would 
have a rate of slippage close to 4%. This value is lower than the 20% rate predicted by 
Wu (2000), but larger than the non–statistically significant results obtained by RB (2005). 
After controlling for spatial dependence, table 4 shows that the CRP slippage drops one 
percentage point to reach a rate of 3%.  
When the slippage effect is addressed by changes in particular land covers, table 2, 
3 and 4 show that from each 100 acres of land enrolled in CRP by 1990, between 7 and 3 
acres of grassland were converted to agriculture and only 0.2 to 0.6 acres of wetlands 
were converted to crop land in the period 1992–2001, respectively. However, when 
agriculture is being converted from forest land, all results suggest that there is a kind of 
reverse slippage –more CRP land is related to more agricultural land converted to forests. 
RB (2005) state that this phenomenon is possible given that farms enrolling in the CRP 
are in the edge of farm profitability, so land conversions is a choice variable that would 
                                                   
11 SAC estimates for models using WCRP are not reported given that they are structurally similar to the 
ones presented in table 4.  happen with or without the CRP. However, one can understand also the CRP as a sort of 
financial support for the initial investments required for tree planting. The CRP, in this 
way, could be providing support in areas where farmers are interested in planting trees as 
business. In order to further investigate this phenomenon I ran regressions using the 
squared value of CRP90 (and WCRP90) where I obtained structural similar coefficients 
for the original covariates and a positive sign for the CRP squared term. This result (not 
reported here) suggests that the crop land obtained from former forests presents a non–
linear relationship with the CRP levels: at low levels of CRP land this program acts as a 
sort of investment buffer for farmers (CRP is correlated with tree planting), but at a given 
point (around 10.3% of CRP land in a county) slippage starts taking effect over forested 
lands. That is, at high levels of CRP land in a county, to transform forest to crop land is 
an option taken by farmers.   
From the results, the model that better fits the data (explaining 34% of the changes 
in OLS and 70% in SAC) and that show the highest rate of slippage is the one predicting 
land conversion from grassland to agriculture (last column). This result is in line with our 
theoretic framework that state that conversion costs plays a predominant role in land use 
change decisions. From the three land covers analyzed, grassland is the cover type that 
presents the lowest conversion costs, and therefore the highest levels of slippage, other 
things equal. In this line, results for the Netcroprent variable also supports theory given 
that the positive coefficients reported in tables 2, 3 and 4 relates to the role that R
a has on 
land conversion to agriculture. The difference on CRP levels variable (CRPdiff90_00) is positive and statistically 
significant in the first column of the three tables. However, looking at the specific land 
covers, the positive relation is only present in grasslands, suggesting that CRP land after 
contract expiration keeps its cover in the forest and wetland case; although only the 
conservation of wetlands after contract expiration is statistically proved. This result is in 
line with some studies that show that farms exiting CRP have more likelihood to return to 
agriculture if the land was covered with grasslands than if it was with forests (again, a 
phenomenon explained in part by the role of conversion costs). Alternatively, in order to 
observe the slippage tendency on counties only loosing CRP, I run regressions restricting 
CRPdiff90_00 to be only positive (and alternative ones setting the negative values of 
CRPdiff90_00  equal to zero), obtaining structurally similar results to the ones reported 
here. 
Another interesting result is the coefficient of the Sprawl variable. The positive 
coefficient (although not consistently significant) suggests that to some extent urban 
growth in neighboring counties triggers the conversion of more open space land to 
agriculture. I also ran regressions using urban sprawl occurring in the same county but 
coefficients, although positive, were never significant. 
 
 
Implications for Policy and Research 
Results of this study have two important policy implications. First, for the efficient 
allocation of resources in agri–environmental programs, the evaluation of slippage effects must be considered in optimally designing conservation instruments. Whether and how 
much slippage occurs due to the CRP is relevant information for USDA planners and 
policymakers. Wu (2000) claims that the 20% slippage rate appraised in his study offset a 
9% and 14% of CRP water and wind erosion reductions benefits, respectively. This 
means that, even if the rate of slippage is low (as found here), the environmental 
efficiency of the program is questionable. Planners should pursue incentives or program’s 
restrictions to avoid the CRP slippage within farms and seek regional regulations to 
decrease slippage across farms.  
Second, results reveal which land covers are more susceptible to the program’s 
slippage effect. Knowledge of this issue would permit planers to focus more attention and 
resources to restrict slippage on sensitive areas. The evidence presented in this study 
suggests that planners should be more careful when implementing the CRP on areas that 
have pristine and environmental sensitive grassland areas. In the case of forest regions the 
program may become a problem if too much CRP is enrolled in the county (levels over 
10% of the non-urbanized land of a county).  
In terms of impacts for academic research, this study contributes by testing the 
relevance of the NLCD retrofit change product for obtaining data to use in economic 
empirical studies. The economic explications and implications of land use change 
decisions and agricultural expansion are topics of great importance given the climate 
change debate, where satellite information together with GIS software are important tools 
to consider in social and regional sciences. Definitively more research can be performed 
using the NLCD Retrofit Change Product to obtain data, and presumably even more accurate and updated ones as new land cover change data become come available from 




In recent years an interesting debate has taken place about the role of the Conservation 
Reserve Program on the expansion of agriculture in non–conserved lands. Wu and 
Roberts and Bucholtz have been the main researchers debating this issue, with the former 
arguing that the CRP produces a 20% rate of slippage (Wu 2000; 2005) and the latter 
refuting the findings of Wu arguing misspecifications in theory and an incorrect empirical 
approach (Roberts and Bucholtz 2005; 2006). This article provides new insights about 
this issue revising the theoretic explanations of slippage sources and land use change 
decisions, and using satellite imagery to determine real land cover changes between 1992 
and 2001. Based on empirical approaches that attempt to avoid the endogeneity problems 
highlighted by Roberts and Bucholtz (2005), I construct an empirical model where the 
dependent variable is described with data captured from the NLCD Retrofit Change 
Product provided by the USGS.  
The use of a new and detailed data set (that includes land cover change 
information), the instrumental variables proposed to control endogeneity of initial CRP 
enrollment levels, and the use of a sample with more observations, are all features that 
improve the methodology used by Wu (2000) and Roberts and Bucholtz (2005), and that 
contribute to complement their debate about the CRP slippage. Results show that the CRP produces different rates of slippage depending on the original land cover to be 
converted to agriculture. The analysis finds that changes from forest to agriculture 
present a non–linear relation with the CRP, where slippage occurs only at high levels of 
CRP enrollments in a county. On the other hand, the slippage effect of the CRP presents 
the highest rates when land is converted from grassland to agriculture. These results are 
in line with theory, given that final land use change decisions would depend on 
conversion costs (to convert grassland to crop land is cheaper than to transform wetlands 
or forests to agriculture). In general, the presence of the CRP slippage is confirmed, 
although in a rate much lower than the 20% reported by Wu (2000). 
The assessments of potential slippage effects from conservation programs like the 
CRP are important to consider given that the environmental benefits from these efforts 
could be reduced and end even become detrimental for certain ecosystems. When 
conserving land, it is important to evaluate how land owners take further land use change 
decisions. Are conservation programs promoting conservation efforts beyond targeted 
areas or are they influencing the ecological alteration of non–protected land cover by 
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Rep. 40, February. Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Empirical Models 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Definition (data source) 
           
Dependent Variables         
NewAg  0.7107  1.2163  0  13.5599 
 
% of total forest, wet and grass land converted to crop land over 
total open space
a 
For_toAg  0.3152  0.5874  0  4.43 
 
% of forest land converted to crop land over total open space
a 
Wet_toAg  0.0287  0.1248  0  2.37 
 
% of wetland converted to crop land over total open space
a 
Grass_toAg  0.3657  1.1440  0  13.54 
 





       
CRP90  3.3911  3.8477  0  23.8253  % of CRP land to 1990 over total open space of county (USDA) 
WCRP90  3.3675  2.9401  0  16.5725 
 
% of CRP land to 1990 over total open space of neighborhood 
counties (USDA) 
Sprawl  0.3931  0.6108  0.0093  7.5757 
 
% of urban growth over open space in surrounding counties
a 
Netcroprent  2.3300  79.4383  -782.9688  2404.705 
 
Proportion change of crop net prices (Lubowski)
b 
Rural dummy  .8271  .3782  0  1 
 
Dummy for rural county: 1 if rural (code 3 or higher in 2003 ERS 
Continuum code); 0 otherwise 
 













% difference between CRP enrollments, 1990 to 2000 (USDA) 
           Pop∆  5.2542  11.3792  -25.3164  67.7498  % difference of county population, 1990 to 2000 (USA counties) 
FarmSize∆  18.0166  231.1453  -100  7500 
 
% difference of county average farm size, 1987 to 1997 (USA 
counties) 
Land  0.4248  0.2972  0.0230  3.8864  Total open space of county to 1992 –million of acres
a 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from cited sources. 
 
a Data obtained from the NLCD Retrofit Change Product raster using ArcGIS 9.3. Open space is the county area less the raster categories “open 
water” and “developed land” to 1992. 
 
















 Table 2. OLS Regression Results 
 
Dep. Var. = 
NewAg 
Dep. Var. = 
For_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Wet_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Grass_toAg 
CRP90  0.0370***  -0.0207***  0.0064*  0.0513*** 
  (0.013)  (0.0042)  (0.0038)  (0.012) 
CRPdiff90_00  0.0661**  -0.0065  -0.0110**  0.0835*** 
  (0.0295)  (0.0061)  (0.005)  (0.0283) 
Sprawl  0.0916*  0.0528  0.0088**  0.0306 
  (0.0489)  (0.0412)  (0.0044)  (0.0362) 
Netcroprent  0.0002***  0.0001*  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Rural dummy  0.1289*  0.1278**  0.0045  -0.0024 
  (0.0797)  (0.0564)  (0.0055)  (0.0515) 
Dist  0.0028*  0.0008**  0.0001  0.002 
  (0.0015)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0014) 
Pop∆  -0.0007  0.0040**  -0.0003  -0.0045 
  (0.0038)  (0.0016)  (0.0003)  (0.0035) 
FarmSize∆  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Land  0.2663**  0.0665**  0.0477*  0.2856** 
  (0.1327)  (0.0302)  (0.0247)  (0.1243) 
Constant  0.0627  0.1576**  -0.0162  -0.082 
  (0.1418)  (0.0712)  (0.0226)  (0.1205) 
R-squared  0.2163  0.2436  0.1040  0.3406 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State fixed effect coefficients not reported. 
 













 Table 3. OLS Regression Results Including WCRP as Instrument 
 
Dep. Var. = 
NewAg 
Dep. Var. = 
For_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Wet_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Grass_toAg 
WCRP90  0.0384**  -0.0404***  0.0026  0.0761*** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0075)  (0.0025)  (0.0164) 
CRPdiff90_00  0.0818**  -0.0177***  -0.0088**  0.1082*** 
  (0.0317)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.0307) 
Sprawl  0.0858*  0.0499  0.0065*  0.03 
  (0.0483)  (0.0406)  (0.0037)  (0.0353) 
Netcroprent  0.0001**  0.0001***  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Rural dummy  0.1330*  0.1293**  0.006  -0.0013 
  (0.0791)  (0.0559)  (0.0054)  (0.0506) 
Dist  0.0029*  0.0008**  0.0001  0.002 
  (0.0015)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0014) 
Pop∆  -0.0011  0.0036**  -0.0005  -0.0042 
  (0.0039)  (0.0016)  (0.0003)  (0.0036) 
FarmSize∆  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Land  0.2454*  -0.0755***  0.0397  0.2817** 
  (0.1313)  (0.0292)  (0.0247)  (0.1228) 
Constant  0.0563  0.2275***  -0.0032  -0.1712 
  (0.1488)  (0.0722)  (0.0209)  (0.1274) 
R-squared  0.2117  0.2547  0.0788  0.3421 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State fixed effect coefficients not reported 
 













 Table 4. SAC Regression Results 
 
Dep. Var. = 
NewAg 
Dep. Var. = 
For_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Wet_toAg 
Dep. Var. = 
Grass_toAg 
CRP90  0.0285***  -0.0069**  0.0024***  0.0289*** 
  (3.1612)  (2.1551)  (3.5406)  (3.8945) 
CRPdiff90_00  0.0392***  -0.0016  -0.0004  0.0451*** 
  (2.3652)  (0.2453)  (0.2641)  (3.2111) 
Sprawl  0.0438  0.0259  0.001  0.019 
  (0.7006)  (1.2321)  (0.2242)  (0.3723) 
Netcroprent  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.2405)  (0.5327)  (0.0647)  (0.041) 
Rural dummy  0.0705  0.077**  -0.0025  -0.0089 
  (0.8602)  (2.2633)  (0.3354)  (0.1266) 
Dist  0.0012  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0012* 
  (1.3677)  (0.4736)  (1.65)  (1.7416) 
Pop∆  -0.0016  0.0011  0.0000  -0.0028 
  (0.5848)  (0.9643)  (0.0617)  (1.2314) 
FarmSize∆  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.4788)  (0.8746)  (0.0849)  (0.0981) 
Land  -0.0669  -0.0315  -0.0005  -0.0213 
  (0.6472)  (0.744)  (0.0504)  (0.2397) 
Constant  0.0335  -0.0063  -0.0081  -0.0119 
  (0.2254)  (0.1199)  (0.7209)  (0.0975) 
Rho  0.606***  0.825***  1.2866***  0.651*** 
  (15.8666)  (39.812)  (39.909)  (15.6493) 
Lambda  0.496***  -0.0261***  -0.431***  0.404*** 
  (42.1701)  (3.1958)  (4.3586)  (19.345) 
R-squared  0.64  0.67  0.5385  0.696 
 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. State fixed effect coefficients not reported. 
 
* significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  
Figure 1. Slippage Effects From Land Substitution. Source: Wu (2000, p. 
983) 
  
Figure 2. Counties Under Study With CRP Enrollments Rate To 1990 
 